This article examines the EU food industry (apropos of the 2013 'Horse Meat Scandal') applying the notion of sociopathy which has hitherto been confined to analyses of corporate banking and insurance (for example, Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012 , Thomas, 2013 . In the 'underground' of the EU meat industry we encounter sociopaths nurtured not only by the rhizomes of its industrial con, but also by collective consumer apathy: Despite a pervasive culture of food fraud -with at least 1305 different ingredient adulteration cases since 1980-there is little criminological examination of the culture and environment of the everyday, 'harmless', sociopaths present in the tributaries of the EU food supply. More than merely mapping the food industry sociopath, our overall aim is to contribute an interdisciplinary reading of the processes which sustain and reproduce his kind.
Introduction
When, on January14 th 2013, the results of Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests carried out by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) on frozen economy beef burgers found in European supermarkets (Tesco, Aldi, Iceland and Lidl) proved they contained up to 29% horse DNA, there was an unprecedented public outcry: Consumers wanted to know what kind of evil made a human pollute another's basic necessity and, more importantly, how such contamination had slipped past existing oversight frameworks. As it has become clearer since, the 2013 meat scandal was a complex case of food fraud i involving multiple producers and suppliers across Europe (Lawrence, 2013) . In this article, we seek a criminological exploration of the intricacies of this food adulteration network using the notion of sociopathy-which has hitherto been the province of organisational and business studies (Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al., 2012) . Our intention is not merely to identify or even discuss the worldview of the sociopath but to make an interdisciplinary reading of the corporate criminal, deploying concepts hitherto confined to analyses of the subjects of psychological experiments, or to large corporations in popular media. In the end we aim to test the fit of the notion of corporate sociopathy ii as a criminological tool.
There are two justifications for this: First, there is discernible dearth of criminological literature on corporate sociopathy outside the traditional scope of large, multilevel, financial
organisations. There has been little examination of how we, as a society, are affected by the seemingly 'harmless' sociopaths who may be the main drivers of mid-level business, specifically in the food industry (Basham, 2011; Boddy, 2013) . In general, there is surprisingly little criminological focus on food crime, despite the fact that the 20 th century has played host to various forms of food scares from things as mild as meat mislabelling to dioxin poisoning -with at least 1305 different ingredient adulteration cases since 1980 (Moore et al. 2012) . Secondly, we believe that within the tapestry of organisational culture analysis, there are critical strands which should enhance critical criminology: Although criminological attention is shifting to so-called 'victimless crimes' contemporary analyses of psychopathy (mostly in organisational behaviour literature) limit their purview to occupations such as banking, law or stock brokerage, perhaps because of the inherent conditions favourable to psychopathy within these career paths (Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012 , Thomas, 2013 .
This opens an interdisplinary window apropos of psychology, for example: The notion of sociopathy-heavily based on the work of Hervey Cleckley's (1941) iconic, 'Behind the mask of sanity', is a widely-cited psychological condition, with literature surrounding its causes and symptoms developing with time. In popular culture, 'sociopathy' and 'psychopathy' are commonly used interchangeably-often divided using skewed definitions, namely due to the presumption that psychopathy is attributable to violent, murderous behaviour, whilst sociopathy being the 'diet' or non-violent version iii . In tandem, while we shall use the terms interchangeably in most places, sociopath/sociopathy shall be used in specific reference to antisocial personalities whose behaviour is a consequence of social or familial dysfunction and, psychopath/psychopathy in reference to people/or behaviour resulting from a defect or aberration rather than an aspect of upbringing.
Along this line we shall claim two related things: First, all corporations (size notwithstanding) culturally nurture sociopathic tendencies amongst their successful players (Pech & Slade, 2007; Boddy, 2013 , Basham, 2011 The FSAI report, initially treated with political scepticism, nonetheless managed to arouse public attention, mostly because the pricing of beef products did not make economic sense.
At the time of the scandal, the price of beef on commodity markets had achieved record highs, as there was a marked spike in the price of fresh meat in UK in 2008, coinciding with the financial crisis, which increased every subsequent year, doubling in price by autumn of 2011 (Lawrence, 2013a) viii . At the time of the scandal, the raw material for a decent beef burger cost at least £3.80 per kilo on the whole sale markets. That was the price of beef trim of the sort that would make a burger that was 85-90% lean from reasonable quality offcuts,' (Lawrence, 2013a, p.12) The meat industry in the EU-mostly due to the trade lax and vast difference in the cost of everything from livestock to labour and spices-is a convoluted network of supply and distribution chain, best described as a 'rhizome' (Lippens, 2001; Deleuze & Guattari (1987) ):
It is a complex, messy, multi-directional network of dealers at various levels; First, there are animal farmers and breeders. Some of these, namely the bigger, more commercially successful, slaughter their own livestock and sell the meat, whilst the rest transport the animals for slaughter to abattoirs, like Red Lion of Nantwich (Lawrence, 2013b (2008) observes, is critical for the retention of identity from the time an animal is born to when it is presented to the consumer as a cut of meat. Traceability is not only important for food safety, but also for ethical/cultural reaons; the meat consumer should not only have confidence in the product-that it is what it is purported to be-but she should also not have to worry about likely side effects on their conscience (Shackell, 2008 (Shackell, , p.2135 .
As the image below (adapted from Shackell, 2008) illustrates, however, traceability is more complex when corporate activity is transnational or cross-sectoral-in which case the traceability/audit trail between the farm and consumer can become circuitous, even when the routes taken are relatively linear. As a simple illustration, complication can arise when, say, Processor C-due to a lack in supply for a sudden seasonal increase in demand from
Retailer 3-needs to purchase processed meat from Processor B, whom buys and mixes meat from Farm 3 and 4 (farm 3 might be from a different country) whilst the finished product sold by retailer 3 might be advertised as "all meat sourced from Farm 5 only." considering that sick and injured animals were being transported, especially when some of them tested positive for Bute. Rather, the horses bore falsified and fraudulent passports.
The plant was later ordered to halt all slaughter whilst under investigation. Investigations proved, however, that the slaughtered, frozen horse meat was allegedly packed and labelled legally as horse.
As it turned out, processed consignments from the Red Lion were subsequently delivered to a Dutch meat processor, Willy Selton, in Oss, Netherlands-yet another player along the rhizome. (Selton had been ordered by Dutch authorities to recall 50,000 tonnes of meat distributed in the previous two years to more than 500 companies across Europe, because he was unable to show records of its origins. (Lawrence, 2013a, p.29) ). Willy Selton is important to the concept of sociopathy because of the deliberate effort his factory put into destroying meat traceability. As Lawrence (2013a) reveals, Polish migrant workers at Selton's were often offered huge bonuses-paid in cash to avoid audit trails-for working in the middle of the night defrosting frozen meat, up to a year old, that was rotten. Some of the workers had to cover their mouths with shirts while some suffered indigestion due to the odour. 
A handful of sociopaths
As these examples reveal, the European meat processing industry is dominated by a handful of players. The Irish ABP Food Group, (parent group of Silvercrest and Dalepak) is one of the major players-perhaps the largest, slaughtering around 1 million cattle a year. ABP employs 2500 people in Ireland and 8000 throughout Britain, Netherlands and Poland, with an annual turnover of £2.5 billion and annual profits of £80 million. Although, as a private, unlimited company, it does not publish accounts, it is linked to the 'Irish Beef Baron', Larry
Goodman-a business tycoon who, in the 1980's came under fire from the Irish public and the Beef Tribunal for meat fraud involving passing of poorer cuts of beef as prime beef.
Since the tribunal failed to prove that Larry Goodman made the decisions relevant to the fraud allegations -he blamed rogue managers and laid them off subsequently-he received his subsidies and by 1999 gained full control over his "empire" again. 
Revisiting organisational psychopathy
In popular culture, sociopathy and psychopathy are commonly used interchangeably-often divided using skewed definitions-mostly due to the presumption that psychopathy is attributable to violent, murderous behaviour, whilst sociopathy being the 'diet' or nonviolent version. Over time, due to the breadth of the psychopathy spectrum, various subtheories and disorders have been drawn and connected to the disorder. However, in 1930, Partridge reviewed contemporary research and identified a subgroup (of psychopaths) for whom difficulty or refusal to adapt to the demands of society is the pathognomonic symptom, and he named this disorder "sociopathic personality" (Lykken, 2006 In the extreme, traits like these will land the psychopath in prison, but, judiciously applied, they may turn him into a hero or saint. haemorrhaging important values which are critical to its welfare and survival. In that sense, the welfare and survival of society is undermined by organizational sociopathy in which corporations actively seek out monsters and nurture them with bonuses and praise.' (Basham, 2011) . Corporate sociopathy not only preserves and rewards psychopathic individuals (Pech & Slade, 2007; Basham, 2011) , but also seems to seek them out as much as they desire the jobs that satisfy their carnal hunger; it's a symbiotic process which advances the interests of the corporation and those of the psychopath xiii . what allowed the criminality to remain well hidden away from the unsuspecting public.
Management failure and corporate amorality
Beside individual psychopathy, focus should also be on the 'management failure' of the retail chains: This failure is down to the drive to maximize profit, by driving down prices (and costs) in order to interest more customers. The logic is simple: If company A could produce lasagnes for 40p each and market them for a £1, they would be making the kind of profit that company B can only hope to achieve by having the same supplier, and so on.
Domination of the cheap (but profitable) products by a handful of suppliers turns it into the interests of the retailers to nurture closer relations with the suppliers and to an extent to protect their sources. The 'management failures' here were not about compliance with the law, but rather poor oversight in the drive to maximise profits, encouraged by the fact that 'everyone else is doing it'. The economic recession of 2008 meant not only that more families had to rely on poorer quality but cheap food, but government laissre fairer in order to encourage economic growth. It also engendered a 'survival for the fittest' mentality among retailers to weather the storms of economic slump. In this conundrum we see the psychopathic tendency to take risks, to make more and more profits, to outsmart everyone from regulators and customers xiv .
Of course not every individual involved in unethical or questionably illegal corporate activities is a head-hunted psychopath; some more fluid personalities are moulded by the container they fill. By the demands of their socio-economical containers-mostly in the pursuit for money and success (Bakan, 2005) -some become operational sociopaths;
'smooth', adroit at manipulating conversations to subjects they want to talk about, willing to put others down, accomplished liars, totally ruthless and opportunistic, calculating and without remorse (Boddy, 2006 (Boddy, , p.1461 .
Amorality is a theme corporations often find themselves described by; unlike immorality, it
is not a pathological desire to commit sadistic abuse of others due to a lack of empathy.
Neither is it the need to function morally due to values one was raised with, it is simply calculating which action brings the most overall value. Substituting beef in burgers with horsemeat might be a risky activity, one may get fined and lose approximately X% in business if discovered, share prices could potentially drop, but the net profits will be £Y, which is substantial; therefore, commit meat adulteration. In such a case, if the projected loss in share price and market share was too risky, they would have just as easily stuck to more expensive beef, increased their prices and painted their walls with "fair trade" posters and commitments.
Organization culture and sociopathy
What this means is that we have to take an objective view of corporations themselves, and specifically their organisational culture, inorder to fathom the myriad ways in which they 'The emphasis on goals, and the necessity to achieve organisational goals, may enhance practices where the ends are held to justify the means. As such, it could be argued that all organisations experience pressure to resort to illegal means of (acceptable) goal attainment,' (Punch, 2000, p.255) .
What this means, for the horse meat scandal, is that, although the taboo xv of consuming horse meat may seem to explain public outrage over the scandal, it is precisely the intepretations of this panic which missed the real danger: How regulatory weaknesses is actually an aspect of widespread violation of consumerrights in European food markets. For illustration, consider these 3 examples: First, a third of the domestic Irish beef market consists of imports from Argentina and Brazil-where, unlike in Europe, Zebu derived cattle is extensively used. In a test conducted by the Irish Farmers Association, 53 random beef products of varying outlets were submitted for DNA analysis that resulted in 15 out of 53 testing positive for Zebu specific alleles, indicating non-European origin: However, 12 out of the 15 samples were labelled as pure 'Irish' beef. (Shackell, 2008) . Secondly, a third of fruit juices sampled were not what they claimed or had labelling errors; two contained additives that are not permitted in the EU-including brominated vegetable oil, which is designed for use in flame retardants and linked to behavioural problems in rats, at high doses (Lawrence, 2014). Thirdly, in 2005, a batch of Worcestershire sauce was discovered to be contaminated with the toxic dye "Sudan 1". Within a week the FSA identified 474 products -mostly soups, snacks, sauces and ready meals -containing the contaminated sauce contained additive sauces and stocks many of which were simplified on the labels as 'spices' that weren't specified. (Shackell, 2008) .
Corporate sociopathy and corporate white spaces
It is probably crucial to note here that most available literature on corporate crime, organisational deviance, corporate psychopaths, or corporate culture that is reviewed here speaks of corporations with a high number of employees, namely entrepreneurial, profit driven businesses like investment banking or petroleum corporations. However, this article has concentrated on the various (corporate) actors along the ready meal supply chain, which bears a slightly different structure; with far less levels of management, far less empowered employees and no project groups. However, Lippens (2001, p.234 ) is correct apropos of organizational philosophy when he notes that 'Post-bureaucratic organisations tend to emerge as more or less loose clusters of ever-changing, ever-connecting, ever-disconnecting networks. Flexible networks are formed in order to be able to react quickly to internal, "internal" as well as
"external" problems. Networks are not just "internal"; sources on the alleged "outside" are part and parcel of post-bureaucratic organisational networks. The "outside, thus, is always potentially on the "inside" as well.'
The same goes for the space in-between networks: 'this space and the resources therein, are always, at least potentially already within each of the networks.' (Lippens, 2001, p.234) .
To revisit Shackell's (2008) schematic above, the structures and networks found outside meat corporations are found inside and vice versa -therefore, the type of competition, power relations, symbiosis and comingling that may take place in more concentrated organisations with numerous levels of management and work groups, are sometimes present between several organisations that lack that structure. This rhizome is an aspect of what others (for example, Bakan (2005) have referred to as the 'white spaces' of late capitalism: the unexamined, unpoliced corporate feeding trough which only receives attention when something goes wrong publicaly. This space is also frequented and thrived on by many because it shields many from responsibility. Bakan (2005) points out that shareholders, directors and executives are all uniquely shielded from responsibility and all bear limited liability in corporate criminality: Where better to hide in (for everyone) during the frantic day-long witch hunts that usually ensue after an exposé than the white spaces between everyone's responsibility? Apropos of this corporate 'iron dome' of protection Punch has remarked that 'the nature of the industry which encouraged covert alliances to cope with structural uncertainty, weak enforcement with co-opted regulators, a near collusive government engaged in prestigious projects and mindful of the importance of the industry for the national economy, etc. -made it almost rational and reasonable to break the law.' (Punch, 2008, p. 104) Thus, when coupled with the psychopathic tendencies that a corporation has, and the ability of directors and managers to become alter egos when they have their "management hats"
on, we begin to see how these "actors" play the part in the monstrous corporate machine and remain independent from responsibility by recourse to 'denial of responsibility ' (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667) . This denial also allows one to sustain the conscience-duality split which Roddick bemoans in 'business as unusual': one is able to eat the cake and have it by rationalising and justifying deviant behaviour-but being able to do this not as autonomous individuals but as corporate actors by day and 'normal people' by night. People who are highly moral in their private lives 'leave their consciences at home' when they enter the portals of the firm' (Punch, 2008, p.105) xvi .
Conclusion
This article should conclude by emphasizing that the 2013 meat fraud, like most exmaples of corporate sociopathy, is not attributable to a single actor. It is, rather, a result of complex and far-reaching lapses in regulation and consumer oversight. This lapse is itself nurtured by the existence of a complex rhizome of supply and distribution, which is sometimes entertwined with organized criminality. That is to say, foood industry criminality thrives precisely in the interstices of corporate sociopathy and public oversight failure. Poor oversight is thus the first broken window we should address in order to reign in coporate sociopathy. How this is to be done is a different thing, altogether. In that sense the meat scandal was not such a scandal, after all: Given the low demand-and therefore low pricingof horsemeat (along with its availability from various places within EU, and ease of moving the horses around) the meat corruption could easily have been done anytime anywhere (and has probably been done repeatedly in the last century).
Even then, given the risks involved, perhaps the temptation into large-scale adulteration has connections with the economic collapse of 2008 and subsequent squeeze on domestic spending. As we have seen elsewhere, where the post-2008 world has been marked by reduction in expendable income for families, it has also been characterised by corporate ruthlessness, with business upping the ante of salesmanship, recruiting the 'the best and the brightest' to survive and so on (Basham, 2011) . Nonetheless, the claims of this article remain: While economic factors are important, the logic that takes a certain 'breed' to survive in the cut-throat environment characterised by perennial collapses in business empires (Hare, 1994; cited in Boddy, 2013) is mostly the decisive factor in food industry sociopathy.
The main achievement of this article is that, while most available literature is mainly focused on corporate psychopathy and sociopathy in large corporations, we have attempted to show how these traits may also be embedded in an unusual place, and that this may even be more needful of attention than the usual sources of public moral panics. While the some speak of sociopath corporations / corporate psychopathy in reference to organizations (even fictional entities) with psychopathic tendencies/ symptoms (Bakan, 2005) . v 'The UK Food Fraud Taskforce defines food fraud as, 'deliberately placing on market, for financial gain, foods that are falsely described as otherwise intended to deceive the consumer.' The common goal is to make money at the expense of the consumer, when legitimate goods are counterfeited and sold as the genuine article or genuine goods are adulterated with extraneous matter,' (Gallagher & Thomas, 2010, p.347) .
vi The Guardian newspaper even ran a daily update of their list of meat processors that tested positive for equine DNA in their beef products: Rangeland Meats (County Monaghan), QK Meats (Kildare), Freeza Meats (Newry), and Eurostock (Craigavon) joined the rank of horse meat processing Irish plants (Lawrence, 2013b) . vii For the purpose of the foregoing, we will not delve into the particulars or treatment of the prime cuts of beef like sirloin and rib eye, or on the treatment of additives and spices etc. Rather, we will focus on the parts that are ground into mince and processed fat -the meat that was central to the scandal -this is because these parts cost less and would fetch more value (or demand) when processed into a finished product (mince or ready meals) than sold in its natural form (Barlcay, 2012; Lawrence, 2013a; USDA, 2013) . viii As Lawrence observes, the prices of beef burgers had continued to fall despite the fact that 'there was a marked spike in the price of fresh meat in UK in 2008, coinciding with the financial crisis, and further spikes each year after that-menaing that, by autumn 2011, wholesale prices were nearly double what they had been in 2008. ' (Lawrence, 2013a, p.6) . ix Shackell (2008) defines meat traceability as 'the ability to maintain a credible custody of identification for animals or animal products through various steps within the food chain from the farm to the retailer,' x As the FSA states, Phenylbutazone, (also known as Bute) is a commonly used medicine in horses ad is also prescribed to some patients who are suffering from a severe form of arthritis. But going by the levels of Bute that have previously been found in horse carcasses, a person would have to eat 500 -600 one hundred per cent horsemeat burgers a day to get close to consuming a human's daily dose, not to mention that the drug passes through the system fairly quickly, so it is unlikely to build up in the human body (FSA, 2013) .
xi A horse passport, as the Department for Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) website mandates, is a mandatory document that every individual horse, pony or donkey owner must have with them at all times when with their animal; its purpose is to ensure horses treated with particular drugs don't end up as food for people (Defra, 2013) . In theory, each animal is assigned one at birth and has its life veterinary history recorded in it. The passports follow the animals as they are traded, for whatever their purpose and can only be slaughtered when an official inspector at a slaughterhouse has checked the animal is free from banned drugs. (Lawrence, 2013a, p.21) . xii The irony is that, "Draap" spelled backwards is the Dutch word for horse: Paard. xiii Braithwaite (1989) was right here in pointing out that when regulation is too strict, unreasonable, uncooperative, inflexibly rulebook-oriented, organised business subcultures of resistance develop. Once there is a climate of hostility between the business (industry) and regulators, the regulators lose capacity for informal control over the managers and how the business is run. xiv Maybe it took more sadistic genius to name a beef processor Draap, the reverse of Paard (horse in Dutch) and then supply "beef" mince internationally (Lawrence, 2013a)?
xv According to Claridge (2013) , horse meat once had its place in cuisine, much like it does in some countries like France and Iceland: At times horsemeat was a sacrificial food, and at others, it seemed to be ordinary food, but it was often rebuked by early Christian missionaries, most often in the context of ritual feasts. In an attempt to tried to dissuade people from eating horse, 'In 723 Pope Gregory III issued a papal decree to St Boniface, explicitly forbidding the consumption of horse meat,' (Claridge, 2013, P.32) .
xvi Does this not remind us of Sykes and Matza's Techniques of neutralisation which allow the delinquent to shift the blame for their actions unto another party? In effect, the corporate delinquent approaches a "billiard ball" conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations … deflecting blame attached to violations of social norms and its relative independence of a particular personality structure. ' (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667) .
